What is the decolonization of transport policy and how can it happen in Belarus?
Discussions about colonization and decolonization often focus on domains that have a distinctly symbolic character — art, education, language, history, etc. However, to what extent is it appropriate to discuss the colonization of the urban mobility domain and the transport sector? How can it happen and what does it lead to? What is characteristic of the urban transport policy in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe? What can the decolonization-based approach mean for the transport policy of Belarus? Let us try to figure it out!
Colonization, which was originally understood as the development of new territories for the purpose of control and exploitation, is being interpreted more broadly today. Therefore, today it encompasses a variety of manifestations of colonization as a process and the state of being colonized, as well as the forms of suffering and inequality that it entails. Sumanth Gopinath, for instance, describes how the development of the pre-set ringtones industry for mobile phones led to the displacement of traditional African melodies from the soundscapes of African cities as an example of colonization. Discussions about colonization and decolonization often focus on areas of life with a pronounced symbolic character, whether it is the tangible or intangible legacy of colonial times. Thus, we can talk about decolonization in the linguistic, anthroponymic, artistic, museum, and educational spheres. Indeed, such examples are evident: colonization aims to establish an idea of colonial culture as the highest and finest, as well as to subjugate the identity of the local population - to create an idea of the supremacy and excellence of the world of colonizers.
Furthermore, colonization processes also manifest themselves in the way high-tech and seemingly neutral spheres, such as healthcare, are organized. After all, they do not develop independently, but are influenced by values, sometimes introduced from outside. The same can be said about urban infrastructures as one of the most complex products of human activity.
Amori favelas with the Congress and the Presidential Palace of Alvarada in the background Paulo Manhaes. Link to The Conversation material
The discussion about decolonization as a process and decolonization as an approach also affects cities. Hamilton, for example, describes the segregation-based planning of Egyptian Cairo (in which different ethnic groups and classes settle separately) as a colonial legacy, which today affects the spatial organization of the city. However, now the division is primarily based not on ethnic origin, but on income level. Sometimes toponymic, architectural, and infrastructural heritage comes into conflict with the attitudes of a large part of society in this or that way. Then decisions are made on renaming, demolition, or renovation, which, presumably, will rid the city of the components once imposed on it.
However, to what extent is it appropriate to discuss the colonization of the urban mobility domain and the transport sector? How can it happen and what does it lead to? What can the decolonization-based approach mean for the transport policy of Belarus? Through an interpretation of facts from Soviet, post-Soviet, and post-August 2020 Belarus, this text offers a decolonial outlook on how mobility and transport are organized in Belarusian cities.
Background: Colonization in the USSR transport policy
In all domains of urbanism, that is, infrastructure, architecture, public services, public spaces, etc., ideas and resources circulate between populations with obviously unequal resources and opportunities.
Urban mobility, including public transport, which this text focuses on, is no exception. But how can we approach colonization in the transport sector? One can distinguish several layers in this issue. One of them is the exploitation of raw materials and resources, including human resources. Colonial relations are also manifested in the sphere of labor, where ethnic hierarchies reserve precarious and low-paid jobs for migrants from the former outskirts of the USSR. A case in point is the shuttle bus drivers from Central Asia in Russia's metropolises. Nevertheless, the colonization of transport policy cannot be reduced to a simple exploitation narrative. Empires often invest in building infrastructures in their colonies, both to consolidate their presence and to reap the benefits.
One of the dimensions in which colonization can be observed is the extent of decision-making autonomy. This does not imply that the empire directly controls the transport development in the colonies. It can also mean that the local expertise is conceptually dependent on the "metropolis", for example, by hiring experts from the "center" to oversee the local ones, or by applying solutions from the metropolis in the "colonies". Besides, the decision makers' view on what the city's transport sector should look like and the place of sustainable development, comfort, justice, inclusion, and other aspects in its development, can be shaped in a colonial way.
The world has seen many examples of metropolises bringing their cultures of mobility and planning to the towns and cities in the colonies. This way the tram came to Indian cities, and rail transport came to the country as such. However, to present this as a "gift" of the empire would be pure myth-making, since much more often metropolises are governed by motives of profit and control.
It can be argued that at the time of their colonization many localities had no transport policy at all. However, most of the colonized places, including Belarus, already had cities and mobility that developed under the influence of certain sets of ideas and practices (for example, in Western Belarus before the Soviets, bicycles were a very widespread means of transportation). Furthermore, the migration of ideas and expertise between the metropolis and the colonies often takes the form of appropriation of ideas that arose in the colony, and their development and implementation in the metropolis.
Like many other empires, the Soviet Union attempted to impose a uniform vision of the "ideal city", which often disregarded the specificities and histories of the territories it annexed. The means of such standardization were the project expert institutions, the official norms, and the uniform education within the Union. Simultaneously, the USSR allocated large resources for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure.
Simultaneously, the planning discourse was very influential: norms dictated the provision of public transport units per capita, the maximum distance of dwellings from stops, the allocation of transport modes according to passenger flows, and so on. Cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants had trolleybuses, those with more than 500,000 had trams, and those with more than a million could boast subways. At the same time, environmental issues were off the agenda, or at least they did not occupy a significant place in the mobility discourse.
Despite the regulations, in practice decisions to build this or that element of infrastructure were often of a political or ideological nature. Thus, subways were built in the capitals of the republics and were not built in some million-plus cities without metropolitan status. In Ukraine, the mining and metallurgical cities of Donbass were equipped with tram and trolleybus systems, and in Belarus, Mozyr and Novopolotsk were similar cases, as they were industrial hubs of oil refining. But such big cities as Bishkek did not get any trams.
In Belarus, as well as in neighboring Lithuania, the preference was given to trolleybuses over trams as a form of electric transport. So, Gomel and Vilnius joined the cohort of the largest USSR cities without trams (and came after Chisinau, Bishkek, and Togliatti). Both countries have maintained the inherited trolleybus infrastructures until today, and in most cases, they have even expanded them.
However, the USSR never fully supplied itself with public transport: it imported Hungarian "Icarus" buses in large quantities, as well as Czechoslovak "Tatra" trams and "Skoda" trolleybuses. At the same time, Soviet-made trolleybuses were exported to countries from other regions, for example, to Greece, probably as a means of influence.
The Soviet Union also destroyed the existing transport infrastructures in the cities that it annexed: the tram systems of Chisinau and Chernivtsi were demolished, while those of Zhytomyr and Minsk were drastically reduced.
The reasons for deviations from the basic principles of transport supply in the USSR are often unknown, as it was not customary (nor required) to inform the population about the decisions taken. Therefore, for the users themselves, the experience of using transport could vary significantly.
The managerial practices are also sometimes shaped by the colonial legacy (for example, the gendered allocation of drivers in different transport modes, such as male-dominated taxi services versus female-dominated trolleybus operation).
Urban Transport Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
Let us highlight some features of the transport policy situation in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region, which includes the European countries that belonged to the "socialist bloc" and were not considered part of the "West" during the Cold War, as well as the countries that were part of the USSR. We use this very regional division in a broad sense and base it on the fact that the assignment of countries to a specific region is not neutral, while the boundaries of the regions themselves can shift. The representation of urban Belarus today is somewhat imbalanced: the post-Soviet context has become dominant. Nevertheless, this domination overlooks important aspects that go beyond the Soviet period (and its legacy), which are not the only factors that shape the history and modernity of Belarus. Still, the inclusion of Belarus in the CEE region in the context of transport systems is not merely an ideological choice, as it allows us to interpret multiple connections and similarities that currently exist.
Impacted by the USSR, urban planning of the countries of the "socialist block" aspired to the principles of a socialist city. Concurrently, for various reasons, including the presence of historical centers, infrastructure from pre-socialist times, higher incomes, more intensive contacts with "Western" experts, etc., in many CEE cities better standards of transport services were established. Furthermore, in those cities cars were more affordable for people with average salaries. To add to that, not all planning principles could be implemented to the same extent.
Today, the CEE countries are characterized by the presence of a vast infrastructural heritage, concerning which decisions have to be made as it wears out. These decisions reflect either the continuity of Soviet/socialist times, or a deliberate attempt to abandon the planning and management practices of that period and align with new models, which are usually found outside the region (such models can be found in Western Europe, China, or sometimes the modern Russian Federation).
Most of the CEE countries are part of the European Union (EU) and can rely on respective support programs. At the same time, they themselves are to comply with the EU norms and principles of urban development.
CEE has plentiful production capacities for trams, trolleybuses, and buses, which enables the region to export more public transport vehicles than it imports.
Motorization arrived in the region later than in Western Europe, where it had by that time come under critical scrutiny, and public transport began to be regarded as an essential condition for sustainable development.
The arrival of large infrastructural EU projects is for those countries that are part of the EU or are supported by it. This is accompanied by a discourse about Europeanisation, expressed to varying degrees, but significant: sometimes as a source of contrasts ('we don't have a proper Europe yet' versus 'we will never have it like in Europe') or as a frame of expectation ('when Europe comes to us').
Shuttle buses at the dispatch station of Serova, Minsk. Link
Shuttle buses deserve a special mention as a phenomenon characteristic of post-Soviet and some other post-socialist cities, which resulted from the combination of privatization, aging of rolling stock, and cultural shifts. In CEE countries, shuttle buses are often viewed as a mode of transport "inappropriate" for a European city.
In official rhetoric, the sphere of mobility is one of the most "Western" in terms of environmental issues, in the sense that the "green agenda" has historically been characteristic of countries with a high level of education and human rights, which is characteristic of the imaginary "West". However, today countries that are conservative in certain respects (say, gender policy), may nevertheless quickly adopt principles aimed at reducing emissions or improving accessibility.
The Belarusian transport sector has both features that link it with other CEE countries, and aspects that make it distinctive. Just like in Poland, Ukraine, or the Czech Republic, there are large manufacturers of public transport in Belarus. For decades, BCM and MAZ have not only satisfied domestic demand, but also exported their produce. Unlike Russian electric transport (except for a few trams in Latvia’s Daugavpils), Belarusian trolleybuses have reached several EU countries, including Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the Western Balkans — Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Furthermore, Belarusian manufacturers actively and in various forms cooperated with enterprises in Germany (the case of MAZ buses), Ukraine (bodies for Dnipro trolleybuses), Lithuania (Amber trolleybuses), Switzerland (Stadler trains).
Independent Belarus successfully provided itself with rolling stock. Belarusian products were competitive in multiple markets -Russian, European, and, so to say, post-Soviet.
At the same time, Belarus, not being a member of the EU, maintained an independent transport policy from Russia. At a time when many trolleybus systems were shut down in the Russian Federation (including those in the cities with over a million inhabitants), which occurred in the last few years, Belarus has been expanding its systems. When Moscow deliberately dismantled the largest trolleybus system in the world at that time (at the end of the 2010s), there was briefly a debate about the suitability of such a replacement in Minsk - but the city did not follow that path. Instead, electric buses began to serve some bus routes.
Similarly to the CEE countries that are members of the EU, Belarus is not characterized by an over-centralized distribution of resources. Regional centers receive an amount of resources comparable to what is allocated to the capital.
These and many other details, such as cycling culture in Belarus, more pedestrian-friendly rules and traffic practices, suggest that the transport infrastructure of Belarus that had emerged by the early 2020s was an example of relatively successful decolonization. Or, putting it another way, that the urban mobility domain in Belarus was colonized to a much lesser extent than many other domains, such as, for example, education. Transport turned out to be one of those areas where the multi-vector approach and the social orientation were truly implemented, at least partially. One can only guess why this happened. Perhaps, the reason behind that was that the country had inherited the production facilities and the system of technocratic education from the USSR, and we are talking about an industry where there was not much demand for humanitarian expertise.
What changed in the 2020's?
The 2020's brought around many changes to the situation with public transport in the region due to the coronavirus, mass repression in Belarus, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The green agenda fell by the wayside for various reasons everywhere around Belarus: in the European Union, in the Eastern Partnership countries, and in the Russian Federation. One of the reasons for this was the pandemic, which raised questions of physical distance and changed the perception of public transport safety. Some cities used the pandemic as an incentive for development of the cycling infrastructure, but still many lowered their expectations for ambitious transport reforms.
At the same time, during the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian army has been inflicting staggering damage on the civilian infrastructure of Ukrainian cities, including the overhead line and its supports, tram and trolleybus depots. Due to the actions of the Russian military forces, for example, trolleybus systems in Bakhmut, Mariupol, Lisichansk, and Severodonetsk stopped working.
In some cases, the Russian Federation invests money in facilities in the destroyed and occupied territories. In particular, tram and trolleybus communication was restored in Mariupol after the blockade, however, only in the autonomous mode. Still, we are not talking about restoring the entire route network to the pre-occupation level.
In the free territory of Ukraine, transport systems also face extraordinary challenges, such as physical damage, curfew, and power outages. The infrastructure of electric city transport becomes particularly vulnerable in such conditions. This, in turn, creates the need for assistance and crisis management. EU cities actively help Ukraine with buses. Besides, Ukrainian cities also exchange and share rolling stock to ensure more efficient passenger service.
In the meantime, the Russian Federation is witnessing both new infrastructure projects (reconstruction, construction of new lines, renewal of rolling stock) and hasty closures of transport systems (particularly trolleybuses). However, it is obvious that funds are being redistributed in favor of occupied territories, which are deemed more important politically. Concurrently, decisions on closing or opening are made without civil participation, and the transport landscape is changing according to logic that is not obvious to ordinary people.
Currently, there is no mass curtailment of transport projects in the CEE countries that belong to the EU. On a general landscape one can say that neither the pandemic nor the war have changed the main course for maintaining public transport.
Colonization of Belarus' transport policy after 2020
After the onset of mass repression in Belarus, as well as the imposition of restrictions and sanctions due to the hijacking of the plane with Protasevich on board, and the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian cities and their development have been overshadowed by other events. Independent media that used to write about the city switched to topics more relevant to the society split by forced emigration. In the meantime, state media switched from the Belarusian and international agenda to the Russian one, regularly publishing news from regional centers of the Russian Federation.
The Belarusian transport sector is stagnating to a certain extent, at least in the sense that infrastructure is not destroyed, nor is mass closure of lines or decommissioning of rolling stock happening. There is even some positive news. For instance, the launch of new trolleybus routes in Bobruisk, Brest, and Grodno, thanks to both the use of trolleybuses with independent operation and new overhead lines. However, some vital changes have happened here as well, and prerequisites have been created for others.
The Belarusian transport sector risks falling into dependency at different levels. Belarusian tram, trolleybus and bus exports are becoming less and less diversified. The opportunities for selling Belarusian produce to European countries have also decreased radically. This leads to a narrowing of the sales market and its increased orientation to the regions of the Russian Federation. What is characteristic of the colonial situation is that these opportunities were affected not so much by the mass repression against the Belarusian population, initiated in 2020, as by the Russian invasion of Ukraine using Belarusian territory. Thus, back in 2021, Bulgaria, an EU country, received nine Belarusian-made BKM trolleybuses for the city of Vratsa. In 2021, the supply of Belarusian transport, both buses and trolleybuses, to Ukrainian cities did not stop either.
Geography of the supply of Belarusian trolleybuses. Link
Besides, domestic demand is no longer satisfied with the production located in Belarus: for example, the "Stadlers" the Minsk metro planned for are being replaced by Russian trains, however, alongside with that the potential purchase of cars for the Novosibirsk metro in Belarus is under discussion.
At the same time, new trams have not been bought for Belarusian cities for several years, neither are they envisaged in the future, although BKM exports trams to Russian cities. In Belarus itself, modern low-floor carriages are hardly used, which makes the tram the least inclusive mode of transport.
In the broader context of sustainable mobility, along with changes in the rolling stock market, non-material, conceptual changes in the framework conditions for the existence of cities should be mentioned. Thus, we are witnessing Belarus' withdrawal from international agreements, which the Russian Federation has not acceded to: the Aarhus Convention, the EBRD financing programs, the Eastern Partnership (unilaterally). These changes imply that Belarus will be able to contact fewer countries directly without the involvement of the Russian Federation. This also diminishes opportunities for the exchange of experience in the transport industry, knowledge transfer, technological cooperation and support of ideas that have emerged in Belarus. At the same time, since 2020, non-governmental organizations and initiatives that offered expertise based on the experience of various countries have been forced to stop working and/or to leave the country.
Transport also reflects a broader de/colonization dynamic at the symbolic level: through the introduction or cancellation of announcements, route designators, information at stops and schemes in Belarusian, as well as the presence of English- or Latin-written information.
Colonization of the territory does not necessarily mean that in the short term the quality of transport services in it will deteriorate (although this is not excluded). Empires operate with developed redistribution systems and are able to control the level of infrastructure provision in places where it is important to them — as well as effectively suppress discontent. However, the colony loses the opportunity to decide how mobility will develop in its territory and what will guide this development: reduction of emissions into the atmosphere, social justice and inclusion, or support for pro-government businesses and a symbolic demonstration of well-being.
What could the steps against colonization of the Belarusian transport policy look like?
Colonization is a long and multi-layered process, which is more complicated than the settlement in Belarusian cities of non-indigenous people. Their subordination to the needs of the metropolis is not instantaneous, unlike nominal changes in the status of a certain geographical territory. Therefore, it makes more sense to think about the degree of colonization and its dynamics than about the presence/absence of something. Accordingly, resistance to colonization is a long-term set of practices, not a plan with an appointed deadline.
In order to resist colonization, it is necessary to formulate principles of urban mobility that will be consistent with other principles of decolonization efforts. It is necessary to develop not only expertise, but also the knowledge of the Belarusian society about Belarus. Gaining knowledge about the city from podcasts and blogs of a neighboring country is a frequent phenomenon for the Belarusian audience, and reflection on its possible consequences is necessary. Are we supposed to know more about Samara shuttle buses than about the Zero Deaths program, the Viva Rovar festival and the Week Without a Car in Belarus? And why, at a time when there is a folklore perception of Belarus as a country of "good milk", there are no high-quality trolleybuses in the country's image?
The narrative of Belarus as a country that "got everything from the Soviet Union" is far from being neutral. On the contrary, it ignores achievements of the post-Soviet period of independence. Alongside with that, one should not necessarily view the post-Soviet in Belarus as something resulting from the dictatorship (or, moreover, created thanks to it): a lot of things appeared in spite of it and were born through self-organization and efforts without state support. The local Belarusian history has a rich tradition of countering the structural conditions.
In this text, hardly anything was said about the Belarusian cycling culture, but it also deserves attention and analysis, as it is not a product or legacy of the Soviet or Russian system.
However, it should be honestly recognized that resistance to colonization is not only a matter of discourse, grassroots initiatives, or direct action. To maintain an independent transport policy in the cities of Belarus, steps are needed in such material aspects as the pro-Belarusian investment policy, vocational education, and planning strategy in the fields of urban planning/design/welfare state/nature protection.
Equally important is the diversification of ties in the field of education and planning, so that Belarus can preserve an independent technological base and not become a degraded adjunct of an empire.
At the same time, it also matters how Belarus is perceived from the outside, beyond the Russian Federation. It is vital to remember that the colonial view of Belarus exists and is reproduced from different sides: this vividly illustrates the inability or unwillingness of many states and institutions to separate the policy on Belarusian issues from that on Russian ones. Therefore, in addition to internal resistance to colonization, knowledge about Belarus must circulate in international communication, and this may be no less important than restoring the export of buses and trolleybuses to democratic countries.
